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NOTES
Illinois v. Krull: Extending the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule's Good Faith Exception to Warrantless
Searches Authorized By Statute
Although the fourth amendment's guarantee that citizens shall be "secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" by the government is emphatic and clearly worded,1 the proper dispo-
sition of evidence uncovered during unconstitutional searches has been a well-
spring of confusion and dispute.2 In Mapp v. Ohio3 the United States Supreme
Court held that evidence obtained by search and seizure violative of the fourth
amendment is inadmissible in both federal and state courts.4 A string of more
recent cases, however, has significantly qualified this principle, pulling many of
the teeth from an otherwise draconian exclusionary rule.
5
Illinois v. Krull6 marks the latest exception to this controversial doctrine of
exclusion. In Krull the Supreme Court found that evidence obtained by law
enforcement officers during a warrantless search may be admitted in the search
victim's criminal trial if the officers acted in good faith reliance on a statute, later
found to violate the fourth amendment, that authorized their activity.
7
Although it sparked a vigorous dissent by four Justices, 8 the Krull holding ap-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The text of the fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
2. Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1983).
3. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. Id. at 655.
5. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). In Leon the Court announced a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by police officers acting in reliance on a
presumptively valid search warrant but lacking probable cause. Id. at 920. The Court considered
whether suppressing evidence in such a case would deter officers from conducting such searches in
the future. It concluded the officers could not be deterred because, in executing the warrant, they
were carrying out their duty. Id. at 921. This deterrent rationale has been employed to admit evi-
dence in a number of other situations. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980)
(evidence admissible when used for impeachment purposes); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40
(1979) (evidence obtained during arrest for a crime pursuant to a statute later held unconstitutional,
is admissible in trial for a different crime based solely on the evidence seized); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (evidence may be used to support conviction in habeas corpus proceeding);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (evidence admissible in civil trials); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974) (evidence admissible in grand jury investigations); Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) (evidence admissible against defendants whose rights
were not violated by the initial search and seizure).
6. 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
7. Id. at 1167.
8. Id. at 1173 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor authored the dissent and was
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice O'Connor had joined Justice White's
majority opinion in Leon, which created the good faith exception for warrant searches.
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pears consistent with the Court's position, articulated clearly in United States v.
Calandra,9 that the Constitution does not command the exlusion of evidence in
all cases in which fourth amendment rights are violated.' 0 Instead, the Constitu-
tion 6alls for suppression as a remedy to be applied only when it deters police
from conducting future unconstitutional searches.I'
This Note analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Krull, as well as Krull's relationship to prior cases and the competing constitu-
tional theories behind the exclusionary rule. The Note concludes that the major-
ity opinion is consistent with the "deterrent-remedy" theory of the exclusionary
rule; it faults the dissent, however, for applying that same theory to support
suppression without raising the possibility that the Constitution might require
the evidence in Krull to be excluded regardless of any deterrent effect.
On the morning of July 5, 1981, Detective Leilan K. McNally of the Chi-
cago Police Department visited a local automobile wrecking yard licensed to
Albert Krull.12 McNally's visit was authorized by a section of the Illinois Vehi-
cle Code13 permitting police officers wide latitude to inspect, without a warrant,
the records and premises of automobile parts dealers. 14 After inquiring about
the records, Detective McNally searched the yard. Using his mobile computer
9. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
10. Id. at 348.
11. Id. at 347-48.
12. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1163-64.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 5-401(e) (1981) (repealed 1983). Paragraph 5-401(e) was
eventually repealed and replaced with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 5-403 (1985).
14. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1164. The Illinois Vehicle Code required automobile parts dealers to
obtain licenses from the State, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 5-101, -102, -301 (1985), and to
keep records of all vehicles and parts bought and sold, id. para. 5-401.2. In 1981 the statute author-
ized police to inspect these records "at any reasonable time during the night or day" and to examine
"the premises of the licensee's established place of business for the purpose of determining the accu-
racy of the records." Id. para. 5-401(e) (1981) (repealed 1983).
Certain types of administrative searches fall within an exception to the general rule that before
the state may search the private property of another, it must first have probable cause, based on
specific knowledge, to believe evidence of a crime will be found. The Supreme Court acknowledged
this distinction in the context of housing code inspections. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 534 (1967). In Camara the Court established that housing inspections based on less than the
traditional showing of probable cause were constitutional. For such inspections to be valid, how-
ever, the public interest in conducting the search, considered together with the limited nature of the
state's invasion, must not offend reasonable expectations of personal privacy and dignity. Id. at 534-
39. Although the probable cause standard is diluted for such regulatory searches, a warrant must be
issued nonetheless. Id. at 538-39. Searches of some businesses are exceptions not only to the general
rule requiring the State to show strict probable cause, but to the requirement of a warrant as well.
See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (alcoholic beverage indus-
try as exception). Such industries are pervasively regulated by the government, id. at 77, and the
statutory programs authorizing the warrantless inspections must establish such a degree of certainty
and regularity of application that the statutes provide "a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant." Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981) (upholding warrantless regulatory search
scheme for underground and surface mines). In Krull the Court accepted an Illinois Supreme Court
determination that para. 5-401(e) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, as it stood in 1981, was unconstitu-
tional. Knell, 107 S. Ct. at 1171 n.13. Shortly after its decision, however, the Court affirmed that
automobile junkyards could properly be regulated by warrantless administrative searches, so long as
the statutes authorizing the searches meet the Donovan test. New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636,
2643-44 (1987).
For an overview of the law governing inspections and regulatory searches of housing and busi-
nesses, see 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 10.1 to -.2 (1987 & Supp. 1988). For a discus-
sion of the concept of probable cause, see 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 3.1 to -.7.
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to trace the serial numbers of several vehicles on the lot, he determined that
three cars were stolen. Krull and two others were charged with violating the
state vehicular code.
15
At an evidentiary hearing, the Cook County Circuit Court supressed the
evidence seized in the wrecking yard on the ground that the statute authorizing
McNally's search was unconstitutional. 16 The Illinois Supreme Court ulti-
mately affirmed the trial court's judgment. 17 It held the statute violated the
fourth amendment 18 and asserted that United States Supreme Court precedents
mandated suppression of all evidence seized pursuant to any procedural statute
purporting to authorize unconstitutional searches. 19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a
good faith exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule applies when an
officer's reliance on a presumptively constitutional statute authorizing a war-
rantless search is objectively reasonable, but the statute is later declared uncon-
stitutional. 20 The Court held that evidence such as McNally's, seized in an
unconstitutional search authorized by statute, is admissible at trial.21 The
Court's reasoning followed a predictable path, one well-travelled by the fourth
amendment cases handed down in the wake of Calandra.
First, the Court in Krull acknowledged the basic exclusionary rule: evi-
dence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment generally is inadmissible in
the criminal prosecution of the search victim.22 Next, the Court reaffirmed
those concepts critical to any limitation of the exclusionary rule: that the rule's
15. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1164.
16. People v. Krull, 107 Il. 2d 107, 111, 481 N.E.2d 703, 705 (1985), rev'd sub nom. Illinois v.
Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987). The trial court found that McNally's search had been conducted
without warrant, probable cause, or consent. Id. It further held that para. 5-401(e), on which Mc-
Nally had relied for authority to conduct the administrative search, was unconstitutional. Id. In so
doing, the court accepted a federal district court decision handed down the day after Detective
McNally conducted his search. Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D.
I11. 1981), vacated as moot, 721 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1983) (by time of appeal, para. 5-401(e) had been
repealed and redrafted in constitutional form). In Bionic a federal judge declared the same statutory
provision to be an unconstitutional substitute for a search warrant because it permitted officers in the
field "'unbridled discretion ... as to when to search and whom to search.'" Id. at 585 (quoting
Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 431 U.S. 307, 323 (1978)). The flaw lay in statutory language giving
officers the permission to search at "any reasonable time during the night or day." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95 1/2, para. 5-401(e) (1981) (repealed 1983). The district court found such wording overly
broad and similar to in OSHA regulation struck down by the United States Supreme Court in
Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 431 U.S. 307 (1978). Bionic, 518 F. Supp. at 585.
17. Krull, 107 I11. 2d at 120, 481 N.E.2d at 709. The case followed a rather convoluted path
through the lower courts. The trial court initially held para. 5-401(e) unconstitutional and ordered
the evidence suppressed. Id. at 111, 481 N.E.2d at 705. The Illinois Appellate Court vacated the
decision by unpublished order and remanded it for further consideration. People v. Krull, 119 Ill.
App. 3d 1163, 471 N.E.2d 250 (1983). The trial court again held the statute unconstitutional, thus
permitting the State direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Krull, 107 111. 2d at 110-11, 481
N.E.2d at 705.
18. Krull, 107 Ill. 2d at 116, 481 N.E.2d at 707. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the
federal district judge's conclusion that the statute, as it existed in 1981, "vested State officials with
too much discretion to decide who, when, and how long to search." Id.
19. Id. at 118-19, 481 N.E.2d at 708. For a discussion of this argument, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 93-103.
20. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1165.
21. Id. at 1167.
22. Id. at 1165.
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prime purpose is to deter future violations of the fourth amendment by police
officers; that violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights is complete at
the time of search; and that the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
deter future violations.23 The Krull Court emphasized that a search victim has
no personal constitutional right to exclusion.
24
After discussing these fundamental concepts, the Court held that its recent
decision in United States v. Leon 25 controlled the Krull facts.26 In Leon the
Court declared the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by a
police officer who acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant,
issued by a neutral magistrate, that later is found to be defective and in violation
of a defendant's constitutional rights.27 The Leon Court reasoned that exclud-
ing evidence could have no significant deterrent effect on a magistrate's behavior
because the magistrate's interests lie in impartial adjudication, not catching
criminals.28 The exclusionary rule was developed to curb only police miscon-
duct. Because the officer who reasonably relies on the probable cause determina-
tion of a neutral magistrate is doing his duty, not engaging in misconduct, the
Court in Leon ruled that exclusion of evidence for the purpose of deterrence in
such situations would make little, if any, sense.29
The Krull Court found no difficulty analogizing from an officer who acts in
reasonable reliance on an unconstitutional warrant to one who acts pursuant to
an unconstitutional statute; deterrence in both cases seems pointless. When the
error is the legislature's, the Court reasoned, punishing the officer for enforcing
the law serves no rational purpose.
30
Because the officer's conduct in Krull, like that in Leon, did not merit the
exclusion of evidence, the Supreme Court sought to find some significant differ-
ence between legislators and judges that might justify employing the rule in
Krull. The Court admitted that the two groups play different roles in the crimi-
nal justice system but found the differences irrelevant. 31 Legislators are like
judges, the Court reasoned; neither is "'inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment.' "32 Although legislators are not "'neutral judicial officers,'"
neither are they "'adjuncts to the law enforcement team.' -33 In their effort to
enact laws that establish and perpetuate the criminal justice system, legislators
are sworn to support the Constitution and are presumed to act in accordance
23. Id. at 1165-66.
24. Id. The conclusion that the exclusionary rule is not a victim's personal constitutional right
has been established only recently. It was first definitely stated by the Court in Calandra, 414 U.S. at
348. It has remained a favorite topic for debate. See infra notes 63-89 and accompanying text.
25. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
26. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1166-67. Some commentators have severely criticized the reasoning
underlying Leon. See infra note 92. Given the similarities between Leon and Krull, much of that
criticism applies with equal force to Krull.
27. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
28. Id. at 916-17.
29. Id. at 920-21.
30. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1167.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916).
33. Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 917).
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with it. As evidence, the Court pointed out that most statutes allowing warrant-
less searches as part of a regulatory scheme are constitutional. 34 Furthermore,
even if the role of legislators could be considered significantly different from that
of magistrates, the Court maintained that the power of courts to review statutes
and declare them unconstitutional already provides the most effective means of
deterring improper legislative action.35 In the Court's view, any additional dis-
incentive that might be created by excluding evidence would be greatly out-
weighed by the substantial social costs-namely, the prospect that some clearly
guilty defendants could go free or receive reduced sentences.36
The Krull Court rejected the idea that because a statute, unlike a warrant,
affects an entire industry and not just a single individual, it merits a different
application of the exclusionary rule.37 Instead, the Court reasoned, the relevant
issue in considering the need for exclusion is the likely deterrence of police of-
ficers, not the number of people exposed to the searches.3 8 The Court also con-
cluded that making an officer's good faith the determinative factor in
suppressing evidence would not result in defendants asserting fewer fourth
amendment claims. Rather, the benefits of a successful motion on those grounds
would always remain quite attractive to criminal defendants. 39 Having deter-
mined that Detective McNally acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the
Illinois statute, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a proceeding at
which the evidence would be admitted.4°
34. Id. at 1168. The Court listed several examples of constitutional statutes authorizing admin-
istrative searches that have been upheld in recent decisions. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)
(Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977 as applied to stone quarries); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972) (Gun Control Act of 1968 as applied to firearms dealers); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (26 U.S.C. §§ 5146(b), 7606 (1964) as applied to alcoholic
beverage industry); United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (8th
Cir. 1981) (Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act as applied to drug manufacturers), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1016 (1982). For a post-Krull United States Supreme Court opinion holding automobile
wrecking yards to be proper targets for warrantless administrative searches, see New York v. Burger,
107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
35. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1168.
36. Id. at 1168-69 & n.9.
37. Id. at 1169.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Court added that subjects of warrantless searches authorized by statute were free
to challenge the officer's "reasonable reliance" at trial, and potential subjects of searches would
always have standing to challenge the constitutionality of such statutes through injunctive suits. Id.
at 1169-70.
40. Id. at 1171-73. The Supreme Court held that Detective McNally's reliance on the statute
was justified because the Court had upheld warrantless administrative searches for other heavily
regulated industries and Illinois properly regarded the inspection ofjunkyards as within the public
interest. Id. at 1171; see generally New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987) (wrecking yards
proper subjects for regulation and warrantless administrative searches). The defect in para. 5-401(e)
was "not sufficiently obvious so as to render a police officer's reliance upon the statute objectively
unreasonable." Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1172.
Krull has already been followed in several jurisdictions. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 825
F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (plenary searches by guards at checkpoint 14 miles from Mexican
border held unconstitutional, but evidence not suppressed because guards relied in good faith on
judicial and statutory authority), cert. denied, sub nom. Ryan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 711 (1988);
United States v. One Parcel of Land, 671 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (good faith exception to
exclusionary rule permits admission of goods purchased with drug money in civil forfeiture proceed-
ing when goods seized pursuant to judicially issued warrant lacking probable cause but authorized
by statute); Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Blosenski Disposal Serv., 532 A.2d 497
1988]
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A four-member dissent, led by Justice O'Connor, strongly disputed the ma-
jority's decision. Although agreeing that the Leon decision had been supported
by the "historic purpose of the exclusionary rule," the neutral role of the judici-
ary, and the finding that magistrates could not be significantly deterred from
violating the fourth amendment, the dissent nevertheless concluded that applica-
tion of Leon's deterrent-remedy reasoning to the Krull facts demanded suppres-
sion of the evidence seized by Detective McNally.
41
Justice O'Connor claimed that the history and deterrent purpose of the
fourth amendment supported the exclusion of evidence obtained under authority
of an unconstitutional statute.42 She argued, first, that statutes allowing unrea-
sonable searches had inspired the drafting of the amendment.43 She then
pointed out that the Supreme Court had taken pains in prior cases to establish
clearly that evidence seized unconstitutionally pursuant to similar statutes en-
acted in modem times should be barred from the courtroom. 44 This historical
background, she argued, strongly supports the conclusion that legislators, unlike
magistrates, can constitute a significant threat to fourth amendment rights.45 To
allow evidence seized pursuant to statutes authorizing unconstitutional searches
to be admitted at trial, the dissent reasoned, would provide legislators with a
positive incentive to enact unconstitutional search statutes. That incentive
would take the form of the "grace period" created between a statute's enactment
and a court's ruling as to its unconstitutionality, during which the state could
freely conduct searches that violate the fourth amendment rights of the public.
46
Exclusion of evidence obtained during this period would be merited, therefore,
because it would effectively deter legislators from passing unconstitutional
search laws.47 After concluding this elaborate argument, Justice O'Connor ad-
ded that even if the deterrence analysis she had proposed did not control, she
still would be "unwilling to abandon both history and precedent weighing in
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (search of defendant's transfer station by employee of regulatory agency
acting in reliance on statute upheld without clear determination of statute's constitutionality).
Krull has drawn some judicial criticism, however, for depriving defendants of a remedy when
their fourth amendment rights have been unquestionably violated by a search. Jackson, 825 F.2d at
872 (Rubin, J., concurring); id. at 878 (Hill, J., concurring).
41. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1173 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1174-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1174 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court in prior
cases had noted that "reaction against the ancient Act of Parliament authorizing indiscriminate
general searches by writ of assistance.., was the moving force behind the Fourth Amendment." Id.
(citing 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 22, § 6 (1696)). The dissent also relied on James Otis' argument in opposi-
tion to the writs, advanced in Massachusetts in 1761, which mentioned that "'[n]o Acts of Parlia-
ment can establish such a writ; ... it would be void (as against Magna Carta].'" Id. (quoting 2
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 523-25 (C. Adams ed. 1850)). For criticism of the dissent's claim that
statutes allowing unreasonable search and seizure inspired the fourth amendment, see infra note 106,
For background on British search and seizure prior to the American Revolution, see infra note 49.
44. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1174-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1175 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor found this threat
inherent in the political nature of legislators, their explicit goal of facilitating law enforcement when
passing laws, and the widespread, sweeping effect their acts have on the public. Id.
46. Id. at 1173, 1175-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1175-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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favor of suppression." 48
As the dissent in Krull suggests, the exclusionary rule has not been uni-
formly applied since its inception, and its origin and purpose have proved unusu-
ally difficult to pin down. 49 The roots of the doctrine may be traced to several
cases interpreting the fourth amendment that were decided around the turn of
the century.50 In Weeks v. United States5 1 the Supreme Court established the
fundamental notion that evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal officers
could not be admitted in the federal courts.5 2 The exact scope and significance
48. Id. at 1176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent further pointed out that there was no
clear answer to the question of how much constitutional law the reasonable officer is expected to
know in an area as open to litigation as administrative searches. The scope of the good faith excep-
tion was therefore uncertain and the rule of the case "both difficult to administer and anomalous."
Id. Justice O'Connor concluded with the observation that by recognizing a violation of a search
victim's rights but failing to offer him a remedy because an officer had acted in good faith, the
majority had eliminated any incentive for criminal defendants to pursue fourth amendment claims.
The result, she predicted, would be that "a chill will fall upon enforcement and development of
Fourth Amendment principles governing legislatively authorized searches." Id. at 1176-77
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1372. There is little question as to the origin of the fourth
amendment itself, however. Scholars attribute its inclusion in the Bill of Rights to the colonists'
desire to eliminate from their government the considerable disregard for privacy rights that had
characterized the British government from the fourteenth century to the time of the American
Revolution. The two chief instruments of unreasonable search during this period were writs of
assistance and general warrants. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEvELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONsTrruTION 23-27, 31-50, 51-78 (1937). Writs of assist-
ance were granted routinely and gave general search powers to organized trades to enforce regula-
tions and protect their monopolies. General warrants were issued by the government typically to
control the printing industry and censor "seditious" publications. Id.
These warrants and writs granted tremendous discretion to the individuals bearing them. Often
they would fail to specify the persons and places to be searched, and their issuance was based on
neither probable cause nor oath. See, eg., id. at 26-27. Authority to issue them was derived from a
variety of sources. General warrants were authorized, at one time or another, by the Court of Star
Chamber, the Parliament, or the Crown itself. Id. at 24, 33, 38. The writs of assistance originally
were granted by the Crown and later were authorized by Parliament. Id. at 23-24, 28-30, 37.
Although the framers of the Constitution were quite familiar with the history of the general
warrant in England, the writs of assistance had the most direct impact on the interests of the Ameri-
can colonies, whose economy depended so heavily on trade. Id. at 51; see also J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION 19-42 (1966) (additional history of the fourth amendment and commentary on Lasson's
conclusions).
50. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1903);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
In Boyd the Supreme Court established the concept of suppression of evidence in the context of
a civil trial. The Government, as plaintiff, sought to subpoena incriminating evidence from defend-
ants. The Court found a subpoena under such conditions tantamount to an unconstitutional search
and seizure, and it found the use of evidence obtained through a subpoena the equivalent of compel-
ling defendants to incriminate themselves. Thus, it held the fourth and fifth amendments com-
manded that the evidence be excluded. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-35.
Adams, which has been described as "a wild turn in the exclusionary rule roller coaster track,"
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1374, addressed the admissibility of evidence seized by officers in a search
and objected to by a defendant at trial. The Court found such an issue a question of evidence, not
constitutional law. Adams, 192 U.S. at 594. Thus, Adams appeared to erase the emerging concept of
an exclusionary rule. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1374.
51. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
52. Id. at 398. Weeks presented facts very similar to those in Adams. Defendant, convicted of
illegal gambling through the prosecution's use of evidence seized during a search, maintained that
the search violated his fourth and fifth amendment rights. The Court distinguished Adams by point-
ing out that the defendant in that case had moved for return of the illegally seized evidence at trial,
whereas defendant in Weeks objected before trial. Id. at 396. The Court found that the search
1988]
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of Weeks have been subjects of much discussion, 53 but the decision clearly
marked the start of a suppression doctrine that had not previously existed at
common law.
54
In three cases handed down within twenty years of Weeks,55 the Supreme
Court widened the scope of the rule to create "a full-blown rule of exclusion at
federal trials."' 56 In Wolf v. Colorado,57 decided in 1949, the Court faced the
inevitable question whether the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule
should apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Court held
that the fourth amendment applied, but the states were not bound to employ the
sanction of excluding evidence. 58 Thus, states were left to experiment with
"other methods" of "deterring unreasonable searches."'5 9 Faced with mounting
evidence that alternative sanctions were failing miserably in the states, the Court
in Mapp v. Ohio 60 declared the exclusionary rule to be part of the fourth amend-
ment, constitutionally recognized and applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. 6 ' In the years following Mapp, however, the Supreme Court
waged a campaign to limit the rule's application in numerous situations. 62
Almost from the inception of the exclusionary rule, its constitutional basis
inspired heated debate. Because the fourth amendment makes no mention of
such a sanction, the justification for mandating one deserves special attention.
The Supreme Court Justices and commentators divide into two schools of
thought. One school maintains that the exclusionary rule is mandated by the
Constitution to preserve the court's integrity and prevent it from becoming party
to the violation of a search victim's fourth amendment rights.63 The other
school views the rule as a judicially fashioned remedy necessitated by the Consti-
violated the fourth amendment and held that the evidence should be suppressed on the strength of
that amendment alone, without consideration of the fifth amendment. Id. at 389.
53. See, e.g., Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition?", 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 591-606 (1983); Schrock &
Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 251, 285-308 (1974); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1374-75.
54. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928), overruled on other grounds by Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1372.
55. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
56. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1374. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
391-92 (1920), established the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, holding that the Government
may not take advantage of information obtained in violation of fourth amendment rights. The
"poison tree" metaphor was first used to describe the doctrine in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341 (1939). Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921), eliminated the vestigial require-
ment that objection to the introduction of illegally seized evidence must be made before trial. Fi-
nally, in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34 (1925), the Court held that a defendant need not
move for the return of contraband seized during an unconstitutional search to avail himself of the
benefits of exclusion.
57. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
58. Id. at 27-28.
59. Id. at 31.
60. 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
61. Id. at 651-55.
62. See cases cited supra note 5.
63. This theory arguably contains two elements. The first is that a court is commanded by the
imperative ofjudicial integrity to review the actions of the executive branch and keep out unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence that would taint its proceedings. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
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tution but applicable only in situations in which it deters police officers from
future violations of the fourth amendment.64
The theory that the Constitution commands the exclusion of illegally seized
evidence to protect the integrity of the courts finds support in earlier fourth
amendment decisions. 65 Several Justices on the present Court, most notably
Justice Brennan, also have advocated this idea.6 6 Such a view has been said to
reflect a unitary model of government, 67 in which an unconstitutional search is
only the beginning of an "evidentiary transaction" that becomes complete when
a court, as part of this unitary government, permits the evidence to be used to
convict the search victim. 6 8 Under such reasoning, courts have a responsibility
to ensure not just a fair trial, but a fair prosecution.69 Commentators have ar-
gued persuasively that the Weeks case was decided under such a view. 70 Indeed,
338, 355 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Kamisar, supra note 53, at 590-97.
The second element is that victims of unconstitutional searches and seizures have a personal
right to exclusion of evidence. This right can be found when one views a court's admission of evi-
dence at trial as consummating the violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights begun by
police in conducting the search. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 289-307.
Justice Brennan seemed to acknowledge the synthesis of these elements in his dissent in Leon,
when he stated:
I submit that [the majority's] crabbed reading of the Fourth Amendment casts aside the
teaching of those Justices who first formulated the exclusionary rule, and rests ultimately
on an impoverished understanding of judicial responsibility in our constitutional scheme.
For my part, [the amendment's language] comprises a personal right to exclude all evi-
dence secured by means of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A distinct variation of the personal rights justification for excluding evidence finds its origin in
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and may be seen in several early fourth
amendment cases. E.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1925); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 638-39 (1886). For a brief description ofBoyd and Agnello, see supra notes 50 & 56.
No Justice on the Court has seriously argued this concept since Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662 (Black, J.,
concurring).
64. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1383-
89.
65. Eg., Olmsfead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928), overruled on other grounds by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392-93.
Early decisions also reveal several collateral "integrity" issues offered in support of exclusion.
See Mertens & Wasserstrom, Foreword-The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: De-
regulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 377-78 (1981). The dissents in Olm-
stead suggest that a moral concern about the unfairness of convicting a defendant with unlawfully
seized evidence may have played a role in the Weeks decision. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469-71
(Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Silverthorne,
by establishing the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, reflected a view that the exclusionary rule
should be employed to stop the United States Government from profiting by the wrongful acts of its
officers. See Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
66. E.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 355 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
67. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 257-60.
68. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 295-302; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
933 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[By] admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary be-
comes a part of what is in fact a single governmental action prohibited by the terms of the
Amendment.").
69. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 259.
70. See Kamisar, supra note 53, at 591-606; Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 285-308. For a
brief description of the Court's holding in Weeks, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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the language of the opinion is studded with references to the responsibility of the
trial court and its governmental role in the prosecution of a defendant. 7'
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,72 decided shortly after Weeks, reveals
the force of this broad view in Justice Holmes' ringing pronouncement: "The
essence of a provision forbidding acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all.
' 7 3
Nearly thirty years after Silverthorne, the Supreme Court in Wolf intro-
duced the other possible rationale behind the rule, casting what would become
considerable doubt on the constitutional basis for suppression. In holding that
states were not constitutionally required to apply the exclusionary sanction, the
Court characterized suppression not as a constitutional command, but as a rem-
edy designed to deter the government from conducting unconstitutional
searches.74 In divorcing the exclusionary rule from the fourth amendment, the
71. Particularly illustrative of this point are the following passages:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the Courts of the United States and
Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and re-
straints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people,
their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures
under the guise of law....
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain convic-
tion by means of unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which
people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights.
... The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles (such
as freedom from unreasonable search and seizure] established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-93.
72. 251 U.S. 385 (1920); see supra note 56.
73. Id. at 392; see also Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 629, 630 (1946) ("As explained in
[Silverthorne], the evidence is suppressed on the theory that the government may not profit from its
own wrongdoing.").
That the Court during this period viewed the rule as commanded by the Constitution to pre-
serve the integrity of the judiciary is suggested also by Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928), overruled on other grounds by, Kate v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Although the
Court in Olmstead held the exclusionary rule did not apply when officers violated a state wiretapping
statute but not the Constitution, it nevertheless recognized that Weeks and its progeny "[declared]
that the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in courts,
really [forbids] its introduction if obtained by government officers through a violation of the Amend-
ment." Id. at 462. The dissents of Holmes and Brandeis, who felt that exclusion should be the rule
even when evidence has been seized unlawfully but not unconstitutionally, advocated a particularly
broad vision of the judicial inlegrity rationale. See id. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 471
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30-32; see supra text accompanying notes 57-59. "[I]n practice the exclu-
sion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches ... ." Wolf, 338 U.S. at
31. "ITihe exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose
person or premises something incriminating has been found." Id. at 30-31.
That the exclusionary rule benefits only the guilty is not an inevitable conclusion. For example,
in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Court described the rule as "a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect," rather than a remedy created to protect the rights of the guilty alone. Id. at 348; see also
Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229,
1230 (1983) ("Under this theory of the fourth amendment, a guilty person, lacking the right to
[Vol. 66
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Wolf Court cited no precedent for its novel interpretation. Nowhere in Weeks
or the cases preceding Wolf had such a deterrence rationale been expressed.75
If observers of the Supreme Court had hoped that Mapp v. Ohio76 would
establish a firm constitutional basis for the rule, they were to be disappointed.
Although Mapp clearly established that the Constitution requires the exclusion-
ary rule,7 7 it failed to specify the reason.7 8 One can argue, as at least one com-
mentator has, that the Mapp Court squelched the Wof deterrence rationale and
characterized suppression as a constitutional command, 79 but by describing the
exclusionary rule as "that command which this Court has held to be a clear,
specific, and constitutionally required-even if judicially implied-deterrent
safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have
been reduced to a 'form of words,' ,8 the majority managed to touch all the
theoretical bases without scoring a run.8 1 The constitutional underpinnings of
the rule were no clearer after Mapp than they had been before it.
Not until 1974 did the Court definitively pronounce the rationale behind
the exclusionary rule. In so doing, it began to trim back the expansive doctrine
suggested by early cases such as Silverthorne. In Calandra82 the Court stated
unequivocally that "the [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."8 3 Its
secrete evidence, is essentially an incidental beneficiary of a rule designed to benefit somebody else-
an innocent person who is not before the court.").
75. According to one commentator,
Nowhere in Weeks is the exclusionary rule called a "remedy" .... The Weeks
opinion "contains no language that expressly justifies the rule by reference to a supposed
deterrent effect on police officials."
Nor, as far as I have been able to tell, is the idea of deterrence expressed for the next
thirty-five years-in the interim between Weeks and the year of the Wolfcase.
Kamisar, supra note 53, at 598 (quoting Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren
Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 536 n.90.).
Wolf's impact on the Supreme Court's view of the exclusionary rule was devastating. Commen-
tators argue that prior to Wolfthere had been little disagreement among the Justices as to the signifi-
cance of Weeks; the idea that the Constitution commanded suppression whenever the fourth
amendment was violated had been accepted almost tacitly. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 65,
at 375-78. With the attempt in Wolf to apply the exclusionary rule to the states, however, the
"harmony was shattered." Id. at 378. Wolfinspired five separate opinions, and "by driving a wedge
between the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule, [the majority opinion] dealt the rule a
blow from which it has never recovered." Id. at 380.
76. 367 U.S. 643 (1960); see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
77. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
78. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1380.
79. Kamisar, supra note 53, at 621-27.
80. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (quoting Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392).
81. "This passage is incorrigibly ambiguous, mixing in about equal portions of vague constitu-
tional references, deterrence rationale, and empirical generalization." Schrock & Welsh, supra note
53, at 319. Kamisar regards Mapp somewhat more charitably, explaining Justice Clark's vague lan-
guage as designed "to secure maximum approval [among the Justices] for the decision overruling
Wolf." Kamisar, supra note 53, at 622.
82. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text.
83. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. In 1979 the Court did make a passing reference to "the two
policies behind the use of the exclusionary rule," listing them as deterrence of improper searches and
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application, therefore, "has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served."'84 This interpretation natu-
rally called for a test balancing costs and benefits to determine if the rule applied
to a particular case.8 5 Employing this test, the Calandra Court found that ex-
tending the rule to exclude grand jury questions based on illegally obtained evi-
dence, which would later be inadmissible at trial, would hinder the grand jury's
investigative purpose and have no additional deterrent effect on police officers.
Questions based on such evidence, therefore, could rightfully be asked in grand
jury proceedings.
8 6
The conclusion reached by the Calandra Court has been said to envision a
"fragmentary model" of government-the polar opposite of the unitary model
suggested by earlier cases. 87 In a fragmented governmental system, the court
serves as a neutral conduit for evidence. A judge must shut her eyes to fourth
amendment wrongs wrought by other government officers and offer a fair trial
based on all available evidence. 88 This distinction was not lost upon Justice
Brennan, who maintained in his dissent in Calandra that the historic purpose of
the exclusionary rule "accomplished the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to
avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people-
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the government
would not profit from its lawless behavior." 89
Despite the protests of the minority, however, the Court employed similar
cost-benefit analyses in subsequent cases to admit unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence in a variety of procedural settings.90 In Leon the Court took the deterrent
remedy rationale a giant step forward by allowing wrongfully seized evidence to
be admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief against the search victim.91 The'
"good faith exception" for evidence seized in reasonable reliance on presump-
seizures by police and preservation ofjudicial integrity. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-
18 (1979). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, made this comment while addressing a fourth
amendment personal seizure violation that led a defendant to incriminate himself. Id. This appears
to be the only reference in a post-Calandra majority opinion that might lend support to a theory
other than the deterrence rationale. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, did not directly challenge Justice
Brennan's characterization of the rule, but argued that "[gliven the deterrent purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule" the evidence should be admitted. Id. at 226 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Because these
references to the constitutional rationale for the rule are rather oblique and tread close to a fifth
amendment issue, Dunaway should not be regarded as persuasive authority for the rationale behind
the exclusionary rule.
84. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
85. A balancing test was first suggested in a prior Supreme Court decision:
[MW]e are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to
other defendants [whose constitutional rights are not violated by the search and seizure]
would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused
of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969); see Stewart, supra note 2, at 1390.
86. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52.
87. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 255.
88. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 255-57.
89. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. E.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1979) (permitting admission of illegally
obtained evidence for impeachment purposes).
91. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
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tively valid search warrants served as the vehicle for this significant change. 92
Seven years before Calandra began the steady erosion of the exclusionary
rule, the Supreme Court decided the first in a series of cases particularly relevant
to the Krull decision.93 Berger v. New York 94 was decided before the constitu-
tional basis for exclusion was clarified. This line of authority addressed the spe-
cific problem of evidence seized unconstitutionally pursuant to statutory
authority. In each case the Court ordered the evidence suppressed, without men-
tioning a constitutional basis for exclusion or couching its holding in terms of
deterrent effect. The reason for suppression was best expressed in Sibron v. New
York,95 in which Chief Justice Warren declared simply that the government, in
creating laws, "may not . . . authorize police conduct which trenches upon
Fourth Amendfient rights."
' 9 6
These decisions are unusual, not so much for their uniform result, but for
the dual standard the Court applied when considering evidence seized under
unconstitutional statutes. This standard, referred to as the "substantive-proce-
dural dichotomy,"'9 7 first appeared in Michigan v. DeFilhppo.98 Defendant in
DeFilippo had been arrested for violating a statute later found unconstitutional
on vagueness grounds. A body search upon arrest had yielded controlled sub-
92. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 25-29. Leon was opposed by three Justices in two
dissenting opinions. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at
960 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The good faith exception also has drawn harsh criticism from commen-
tators. See Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L. J. 906 (1986); LaFave, "The Seductive Call of
Expediency" United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 895;
Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 65, at 410-62; Stewart, supra note 2, at 1399-1403.
For example, Leon has been criticized for the following: advancing a mistaken view of the
constitutional rationale behind the exclusionary rule, Leon, 468 U.S. at 931-38 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); LaFave, supra, at 901-02; failing to treat the Constitution as law because the good faith excep-
tion acknowledges a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights yet wholly denies him a remedy,
Leon, 468 U.S. at 977-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dripps, supra, at 934-39; failing to supply empiri-
cal evidence supporting the cost of the rule to the criminal justice system or its beneficial effect on it,
Leon, 468 U.S. at 949-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting); LaFave, supra, at 902-09; chilling the develop-
ment of fourth amendment jurisprudence, see Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 65, at 451-53;
encouraging the breakdown of law enforcement's internal warrant screening procedures and putting
"a premium on police ignorance of the law," Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dripps,
supra, at 930-31; and envisioning the paradoxical situation in which an officer can reasonably rely on
a warrant authorizing an unreasonable search, Leon, 468 U.S. at 960-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (statute allowed officers to body search all persons
found on premises being searched pursuant to warrant, without a reasonable belief that they were
armed and presently dangerous); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979) (statute permitted
luggage searches of all persons entering Puerto Rico); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973) (statute allowed vehicle searches within 100 miles of Mexican border); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (statute authorized stop-and-frisk searches without suspicion that search
victim was a present danger to officer); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (staiute permitted
police to obtain eavesdropping warrants with insufficient showing of probable cause).
94. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
95. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
96. Id. at 61. In Sibron the Court did not declare the stop-and-frisk statute in question uncon-
stitutional, because it could be carried out in a constitutional manner. The Court adamantly insisted,
however, that legislative authority could never serve as a justification for an unconstitutional search
and seizure. Id. at 59-62; see infra note 109.
97. People v. Krull, 107 Ill. 2d 107, 118, 481 N.E.2d 703, 708 (1985), rev'd sub nom. Illinois v.
Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
98. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
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stances that subsequently led to a possession charge.99 The Court declared the
contraband admissible as evidence and confronted the apparent inconsistency
with the Berger line of authority. Evidence seized pursuant to procedural stat-
utes authorizing unconstitutional searches is inadmissible, the Court explained,
but evidence from arrest searches conducted pursuant to unconstitutional stat-
utes that create substantive crimes is not.10 The Leon decision reinforced this
new substantive-procedural dichotomy. 10 1 The Leon Court, in creating the good
faith exception for officers relying on presumptively valid search warrants, ac-
knowledged the importance of the DeFillippo distinction by stating:
We have held, however, that the exclusionary rule requires suppression
of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not
yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and
seizures without probable cause or search warrants.... The substan-
tive Fourth Amendment principles announced in those cases are fully
consistent with our holding here.
102
To reach the conclusion in Krull-that evidence should be admitted when
unconsitutionally seized by an officer acting in good faith reliance on a statute-
the majority had to address the line of search statute cases distinguished in
DeFillippo and Leon. The Krull Court confronted this seemingly conflicting pre-
cedent in a footnote, dismissing it with the following explanation:
None of the cases cited in DeFilippo in support of the [substantive-
procedural] distinction, however, addressed the question of whether a
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized
when an officer's reliance on a statute was objectively reasonable.
Rather, those cases simply evaluated the constitutionality of particular
statutes, or their application, that authorized searches without a war-
rant or probable cause. 103
If one accepts the deterrent-remedy view of the rule announced in Leon,
this explanation, cavalier as it may be, seems reasonable enough. The Berger
line of cases simply assessed whether probable cause to search existed under
various statutes. The rationale behind the exclusionary rule had never been at
issue in those cases. The Krull Court's acknowledgement of the good faith ex-
ception, however, necessarily modifies the analysis that had been applied to Ber-
ger and the other search statute cases. If these cases were to come before the
99. Id. at 39-40. DeFillippo was arrested for refusing to identify himself when stopped by an
officer for engaging in behavior warranting further investigation, a crime held to be unconstitution-
ally vague. A body frisk upon his arrest yielded unlawful drugs in a tin foil packet, which provided
the basis for a second, and constitutional, charge of possession of controlled substances. Id. at 33-34.
100. Id. at 39. The Court characterized Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979), Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), Sibron, and Berger as involving "statutes which, by
their own terms, authorized searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the traditional war-
rant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment," and stated "Our holding today is
not inconsistent with these decisions." Id.
101. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 912 n.8; see supra notes 25-29, 91-92 and accompany-
ing text.
102. Leon, 468 U.S. at 912 n.8.
103. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1170 n.12.
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Court again, their outcome, at least with regard to the suppression of evidence,
would very likely be different.
The dissent in Krull found the substantive-procedural dichotomy estab-
lished in prior cases commanded more respect.10 4 Although claiming that she
accepted the Leon result and the deterrent-remedy rationale, Justice O'Connor
argued that suppression of evidence in cases involving procedural search statutes
is proper; suppression would deter legislators from enacting laws that threaten
fourth amendment values. 10 5 The Berger line of cases and the history of the
fourth amendment, the dissent maintained, reveal that legislators are inclined at
times to subvert the amendment.' 0 6 Therefore, a legislature could be expected
to respond appropriately to the sanction of excluding evidence.'0 7
104. The evidence seized in the previous search statute cases cited supra note 93 could, however,
be suppressed if the defendants could establish that in drafting the statutes at issue, "the legislature
wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws" or that the provisions of the stat-
utes "are such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional."
Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1170. The dissent criticized this "bad faith" exception, claiming that the Court
failed to explain how or when a legislature can be said to have "wholly abandoned" its responsibility,
id. at 1177 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and that "it is not apparent how much constitutional law
[pertaining to administrative searches] the reasonable officer is expected to know," id. at 1176
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1173-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1174 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). On the subject of pre-Revolutionary history, Justice
O'Connor claimed that "[s]tatutes authorizing unreasonable searches were the core concern of the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment." Id. The Court, she claimed, had recognized that fact on
several occasions. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 & n.21 (1980); Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886)). The deci-
sions cited by the dissent certainly discussed the history of the fourth amendment and the British
abuses under the writs of assistance, but nowhere did they even mention the statute authorizing the
writs. Further, nowhere do these opinions characterize that statute as a "core concern" of the fram-
ers or maintain that reaction against it was "the moving force behind the Fourth Amendment."
Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1174 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
A fair appraisal of the history of the writs and the infamous general warrants reveals that the
actual source of authority for the issuance of the writs was probably not a "core concern" of anyone.
As discussed supra note 49, the searches were carried out by the executive branch of the government,
and authority for issuing the warrants came from whatever source the executive could find available.
These sources included at various times the Parliament, the Crown, the Court of High Commission,
and the Court of Star Chamber. N. LASSON, supra note 49, at 23-24, 28-29, 33, 37-38.
The "ancient Act of Parliament" to which Justice O'Connor referred happened to be the instru-
ment from which authority for the writs was derived at the time of the Revolution. Krull, 107 S. Ct.
at 1174 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The act was drafted in the 1600s and debate concerning it fo-
cused more on its interpretation and the question whether it could be applied to the American
colonies (as opposed to the British mainland) than on a sense of outrage at a pereeived legislative
abuse. N. LASSON, supra note 49, at 58-63.
The framers were much more concerned about the abuse of power by officers of the executive
branch. Through the passage of the fourth amendment they hoped to find a means to prevent of-
ficers from barging into their businesses and homes without reasonable grounds to search. Kamisar,
supra note 53, at 574. The particular mechanism for checking this threat of unwarranted police
action was the judiciary, which the framers felt confident could serve as an impartial source of
authority for issuing warrants. Id. at 574-76. The mechanism for resolving abuses of the legislative
branch was soon to become, of course, judicial review. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137 (1803).
In light of the realities of pre-Revolutionary history, Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the
significance of statutory authority for writs of assistance seems rather exaggerated. It should also be
noted that the "ancient Act," 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 22, § 6 (1696), cited by Justice O'Connor did not
originally create the writs but merely conveyed the powers of English customs agents to their Ameri-
can counterparts. An earlier act of Charles II actually authorized the writs. 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 11,
§ 5 (1662); see N. LASSON, supra note 49, at 53.
107. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1174.
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The argument that legislators, because of their political nature, pose a sig-
nificant threat to the fourth amendment rights of citizens may well be correct;
the language of Sibron 108 certainly suggests this conclusion.10 9 However, Sibron
and the other search statute cases never explored the constitutuional rationale
for excluding evidence and never mentioned the deterrent effect of suppression.
The suggestion that they might stand as precedent for the proposition that sup-
pression effectively deters unconstitutional legislative action, therefore, seems
far-fetched. If such a thesis has any force at all, it dissipates in the face of the
Krull majority's argument that a declaration of unconstitutionality, likely to be
obtained through an injunctive suit, would serve the same deterrent purpose. 
110
Justice O'Connor recognized the weaknesses inherent in using the deter-
rence rationale to justify suppression when she concluded her main argument
with the declaration: "Even conceding that the deterrent value of the exclusion-
ary rule in this context is arguable, I am unwilling to abandon both history and
precedent weighing in favor of suppression."' IIt The meaning of this cryptic re-
mark does not appear on the face of the opinion. Although she declined to
discuss the implications of her comment, it certainly suggests that Justice
O'Connor is not wholly convinced that the remedial force of the rule can pro-
vide the sole justification for the exclusion of evidence.
Justice O'Connor chose to argue for suppression of Detective McNally's
evidence under the theory that the exclusionary rule's deterrent value provides
the sole constitutional rationale for its use. In doing so, she employed a strained
analysis of prior case law and fourth amendment history. She might have cho-
sen an alternative theoretical approach, however, that would have provided an
argument for suppression supported by prior cases and by the peculiar facts of
Krull.
The judicial integrity theory, which maintains that the Constitution com-
mands the exclusion of illegally seized evidence, seems particulary well suited
for application to the Krull facts. This theory envisions a unitary system of
government in which the judiciary has an obligation to halt the violation of an
individual's fourth amendment rights." 2 Typically a court fulfills this responsi-
bility by nullifying the actions of the executive branch." 13 On facts such as
Krull, however, a court must confront an even greater threat to fourth amend-
ment rights: two branches of government-the legislative and the executive-
108. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
109. In Chief Justice Warren's words:
New York is, of course, free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet the needs
of local law enforcement, and in the process it may call the standards it employs by any
names it may choose. It may not, however, authorize police conduct which trenches upon
Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct.
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 60-61 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
110. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1169. Illinois automobile parts dealers had brought precisely such an
action in response to the statutory provision at issue in Krull. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v,
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. I11. 1981); see supra note 16.
111. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 295-302; see supra notes 63, 65-69 and accompanying
text.
113. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 53, at 325.
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have acted in tandem to bring about the unreasonable search and seizure. If a
court were to disregard that this evidence had been procured by the police under
legislative authority in violation of the fourth amendment, and to permit its in-
troduction at trial, nothing less than a tripartite violation of a search victim's
rights would result-a scenario completely at odds with the language of
Weeks.114
Employing the judicial integrity theory to justify suppression could also ex-
plain the Berger line of search statute cases without resort to the weak "legisla-
tive deterrence" logic proposed by the Krull dissent. Berger was decided in
1967-seven years before Calandra purported to declare the supremacy of the
deterrence rationale. Therefore, an argument could be made that this line of
cases grew out of the original judicial integrity view of the exclusionary rule.
The Court's later efforts to distinguish the search statute decisions from deci-
sions such as DeFillippo and Leon, which admitted illegally seized evidence
based on a deterrent remedy rationale, could be explained as an appropriate
recognition of the peculiar combination of legislative and executive authority
behind the fourth amendment violations in cases like Berger. Because such a
combination involves a legislature specifically authorizing "police conduct
which trenches on fourth amendment rights,"' 15 it can be characterized as par-
ticularly egregious. Therefore, it merits the special judicial treatment of
exclusion.
In a portion of their brief to the United States Supreme Court, defendants
argued a similar point. 116 The search statute cases, they maintained, were de-
cided under the judicial integrity basis for the exclusionary rule and, therefore,
the good faith exception should not apply."17 Obviously, Justice O'Connor chose
not to adopt this concept in the dissenting opinion, but because she admitted
that her "[unwillingness] to abandon both history and precedent weighing in
favor of suppression" 18 was not grounded in the deterrence rationale she had
advanced'earlier, she seemed to suggest, in a roundabout way, that the judicial
integrity rationale guided her hand. She elected not to develop this possibility,
however, and as a result the dissenting opinion lost much of its force. The ma-
jority opinion in Krull appears completely consistent with the free-wheeling de-
terrence concept developed from Calandra through Leon, and the dissent's
114. See supra note 71.
115. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 61.
116. The petitioner... simply [ignores] one of the policies underlying the exclusionary rule.
In Dunaway v. New York. . . this Court recognized that the use of evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional rights is excluded not only as a deterrent to police conduct but
also because the use of such tainted evidence "is more likely to compromise the integrity of
the courts." Thus when the Supreme Court concluded in DePhillippo and Leon (which
cites the Dunaway opinion ... ) that the exclusionary rule applied to suppress evidence
obtained pursuant to procedural statutes that authorized searches under circumstances
which did not satisfy traditional warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, the focus was not at all upon the deterrence policy of the rule. The focus
implicitly rested upon the integrity of the courts and the sanctity of the Constitution.
Brief for Respondent at 23-24, Krull (No. 85-608) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
218 (1979)). The significance of Dunaway is discussed supra note 83.
117. Brief for Respondent at 24-25, Krull.
118. Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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contrived use of precedent and history cannot create a credible argument for
suppression using the same deterrent-remedy analysis.
Justice Day's historic opinion in Weeks, which gave rise to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, appears to have sprung not from a flexible deter-
rence rationale, but from the normative principle that the judiciary bears a spe-
cial responsibility to protect an individual's fourth amendment rights.' 19 Weeks
and the early decisions that followed it suggest that the Constitution commands
the courts to exclude improperly seized evidence to protect judicial integrity and
a search victim's fourth amendment rights. Historical appearances aside, how-
ever, that view no longer holds the support of a majority on the Supreme Court.
The deterrent-remedy rationale, conceived in Wolf and taken to its height in
Leon, has emerged as the dominant theory behind the exclusionary rule.120
Given the evolution of the deterrence rationale and the good faith exception, the
Krull Court's conclusion-that evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on
search statutes violating the fourth amendment is admissible-seems ines-
capable. The Krull dissent, unable to accept the admissibility of evidence thus
seized, advanced the case for suppression only in terms of deterrence. In so
doing, the dissent passed up an opportunity to reaffirm what appears to have
been the original judicial integrity theory behind the exclusionary rule and pro-
duced instead a poorly constructed argument that misrepresented fourth amend-
ment history.
To characterize Justice O'Connor's dissent as the minority's endorsement
of the deterrent-remedy basis for the exclusionary rule and the last gasp of the
judicial integrity rationale would be an overstatement.1 2 1 Krull's significance,
however, does seem to lie not in the majority's holding but in the dissent's ap-
proach to refuting it.122 When given an unusually strong factual basis from
119. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
121. It should be noted that Justice Marshall joined Justice O'Connor's dissent with a brief
qualification: "I do not find it necessary to discuss the Court's holdings in ... [Calandra, Stone v.
Powell, and United States v. Janis]. Accordingly, I do not subscribe to that portion of the opinion."
Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1173 (Marshall, J., dissenting) His remark presumably refers to the establish-
ment of the deterrent-remedy rationale, although he did not offer further explanation.
122. Justice Brennan, in his dissent to Leon, expressed a fear that the good faith exception to
warrant searches would lead to a similar exception for searches without warrants:
[Tihe full impact of the Court's regrettable decisions will not be felt until the Court at-
tempts to extend this rule to situations in which the police have conducted a warrantless
search solely on the basis of their own judgment about the existence of probable cause and
exigent circumstances.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 959 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This concern has been
echoed by commentators as well. E.g., Dripps, supra note 92, at 944-47; LaFave, supra note 92, at
926-29; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 65, at 454-55.
The temptation will also be great to extend Leon to without-warrant cases, for surely there
is even more reason to accept the officer's good-faith mistaken judgment as to what the law
allows when he was not even in a position to check with a judge first! Then the Court's
abjuration of the exclusionary rule will be virtually complete.
LaFave, supra note 92, at 930.
Although Krull does address a warrantless search situation, it does not constitute a bold step in
the direction that LaFave, Justice Brennan, and others feared the Court might take. Warrantless
searches authorized by statute are unlike the typical situations in which a warrant is not required.
These situations include, for example, probable cause in exigent circumstances, consent, search inci-
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which to advocate what appears to have been the original intent behind the rule,
the dissent declined the opportunity. By choosing to meet the majority on the
slippery playing field of deterrence, the dissent failed to question the validity of
that particular rationale. That choice, although serving the purpose of advocat-
ing suppression in this particular case, had the added effect of moving the Court
dent to arrest, and weapons frisks. An officer conducting a search under a procedural search statute
is not called on to exercise his own judgment as to what the law allows. Instead, like the officers in
Leon, he relies on a superior source of authority-in this case a legislative statute or regulation. So
long as that statute is not blatantly unconstitutional, his personal judgment should not come into
play. See Krull, 107 S. Ct. at 1170, 1172. Insofar as Krull does not apply the good faith exception to
an officer's personal judgment, the holding does not break new ground.
The limits of Krull become apparent when one considers the Court's decision in Arizona v.
Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), in which the Court passed up an opportunity to expand the good faith
exception to a typical without-warrant search. In Hicks an officer executing a valid warrantless
search for weapons and shooting suspect noticed an expensive stereo in the suspect's "squalid and
otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment." Id. at 1152. Suspecting that the stereo might be
stolen property, the officer moved the turntable to see and copy its serial number. The stereo was
later determined to be stolen. Id. Considering the defendant's motion to suppress, the Supreme
Court, in a six-to-three opinion, ruled that moving the turntable amounted to an unconstitutional
search without probable cause which was beyond the scope of the officer's initial search and not
jusitifed by the "plain view" doctrine. Id. at 1153-54.
As part of its argument, the State urged that, if the stereo search were unconstitutional, the
evidence uncovered should be admitted under Leon because the officer had acted in the good faith
belief that this "plain view" warrantless search was constitutional. Id. at 1155; see Brief of Petitioner
at 29-31, Hicks (No. 85-1027). Because the constitutionality of his actions was debated all the way
to the United States Supreme Court, it would follow that the officer acted in an objectively reason-
able good faith belief that his search was permissible. Hicks, then, presented an appropriate opportu-
nity to extend the good faith exception to those warrantless searches that require an officer's on-the-
scene determination of constitutionality. The Court, however, refused to consider the good faith
exception issue. "That was not the question on which certiorari was granted," Justice Scalia ex-
plained, "and we decline to consider it." Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1155.
Although the decision not to pursue the good faith issue in Hicks went unexplained and there-
fore remains ambiguous, it serves to place Krull in perspective as a logical extension of Leon. See
supra text accompanying notes 103-04. To characterize Krull as the coup de grace to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule would certainly seem to overstate its significance. The narrow five-to-
four margin by which it was decided, combined with the Court's refusal to consider the good faith
issue in Hicks, may signal that the good faith exception is not likely to swallow the entire exclusion-
ary rule in the foreseeable future.
It should be noted that lower courts in general have taken a rather dim view of expanding the
good faith exception to typical warrantless searches. See United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692,
698-99 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The Leon exception, however .... does not create the broad 'good faith'
exception [for warrantless searches] the government suggests."); United States v. Whaley 781 F.2d
417, 421 (5th Cir. 1986) ("To extend the exception so far as to allow evidence of a clearly unlawful
warrantless search of residential property would put too great a premium on ignorance of the law
and would virtually terminate the exclusionary rule."); United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158,
1165 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985); United States v. McBean, No. CR487-97,
slip op. at 26-28 & n.6. (S.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (refusing to
extend good faith exception to search unconstitutional due to insufficient consent; court noted of-
ficer's good faith subjectively, but not objectively, reasonable); State v. Prestwich, 112 Idaho 590,
593, 733 P.2d 811, 814 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to apply good faith exception to warrantless
search of defendant's property conducted by probation officer lacking "reasonable grounds" for
search); see also United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The fact that Officer
Jensen conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle which violated Vasey's Fourth Amendment
rights precludes any reliance on the good faith exception."); State v. Williams, 409 N.W.2d 553, 556
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (court rejected argument that officer's good faith could prevent suppression of
evidence seized during unconstitutional search incident to arrest). But see United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830, 840-47 (5th Cir. 1980) (splintered en bane), (potentially far-reaching pre-Leon en-
dorsement of good faith exception); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); People v. Mashaney, 160 Ill.
App. 3d 390, 513 N.E.2d 615, 618 (1987) (good faith exception applied to officer trespassing un-
knowingly on defendant's land when seeking vantage point from which to spy defendant's marijuana
crop).
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further away from what may well have been the original basis for the exclusion-
ary rule. In this manner, the dissenting Justices in Krull managed to enhance
the credibility of a deterrence theory that has served as the majority's useful tool
for paring down the fourth amendment's troublesome exclusionary doctrine.
J. DONALD HOBART, JR.
